From “Bharat” to a Multipolar World: Jaishankar’s UNGA 2026 Doctrine of Peace and Reformed Multilateralism

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Can BRICS Help India and China Move from Confrontation to Competitive Coexistence?

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India–China: From Rivalry to Competitive Coexistence?


  • For India and China, the question is no longer whether they can become close friends. The more consequential question is-
"whether two Asian powers can compete without allowing competition to become confrontation."
  • That question will acquire fresh significance when New Delhi hosts the "18th BRICS Summit on September 12–13, 2026." For India and China, BRICS is not a mechanism for resolving their Himalayan boundary dispute. But it may provide something equally important: a structured political space in which two rivals can continue talking.
  • India and China together account for more than 2.8 billion people and represent two of Asia's most consequential civilisational, economic and strategic powers. Yet their relationship has repeatedly collided with mistrust. The Galwan Valley clash of 2020, in which 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were officially reported killed, brought that mistrust to its most dangerous point in decades.


From Panchsheel to Galwan

  • There is an extraordinary historical irony in the India–China relationship. In New Delhi, "Panchsheel" is not merely a diplomatic concept; it is embedded in the geography of the capital itself.
  • The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formally enunciated in the 1954 India–China agreement. They emphasized-
  1. mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
  2. mutual non-aggression, 
  3. non-interference, 
  4. equality and mutual benefit, and 
  5. peaceful coexistence.
  • Panchsheel represented a larger post-colonial aspiration: newly independent countries could construct international relations based on sovereignty and coexistence rather than military blocs and great-power domination.
But the 1962 India–China war exposed the fragility of that vision.
  • For decades thereafter, the two countries attempted to compartmentalize their differences. 
  • The boundary remained unresolved, but mechanisms were created to prevent the dispute from destroying the broader relationship. For much of the first two decades of the 21st century, that approach broadly held.
Galwan changed it!

  • Since 2020, India's position has increasingly been that peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control are fundamental to the overall relationship. That has made the border not merely one issue among many, but a central measure of strategic trust.

The Slow Return of Diplomacy

  • Yet the post-Galwan relationship has not remained frozen.
  • The first visible high-level contact came at "the G20 Summit in Bali in November 2022," when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping briefly interacted. Their engagement remained limited, but it demonstrated that political communication had not disappeared.
  • "The 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg" provided another opportunity for the two leaders to discuss bilateral concerns.
  • The more consequential moment came at "the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October 2024." By then, India and China had reached an agreement concerning patrolling arrangements and disengagement in areas affected by the 2020 crisis. Modi and Xi subsequently held a structured bilateral meeting—the first such formal meeting between them in years.
  • Diplomacy was beginning to move from crisis management towards management of the broader relationship.
  • The process continued through the "SCO framework in 2025," including Modi's visit to China for the Tianjin summit, and has continued into 2026. Most recently, the presence of Modi, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin together at "the SCO Summit in Bishkek" again demonstrated the importance of maintaining high-level diplomatic channels.
  • There are also practical signs of "cautious normalization," including progress towards restoring direct air services and renewed institutional exchanges.
  • But normalization should not be confused with strategic trust.

Why BRICS Matters

  • BRICS was never designed to solve the India–China boundary question.
  • Its origins were economic. Economist "Jim O'Neill" coined the term BRIC in 2001 to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as major emerging economies. The four countries began meeting at ministerial level in 2006, while the first leaders' summit took place in Yekaterinburg in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011, transforming BRIC into "BRICS."
  • Since then, the grouping has evolved into a broader political and diplomatic forum representing a much larger part of the Global South.
  1. For India, BRICS provides a platform to push for greater representation of emerging powers in global governance. 
  2. For China, it offers a "vehicle for expanding" the influence of non-Western powers. 
  3. For Russia, it is an increasingly important diplomatic platform. 
  4. For other members and partners, it offers access to a forum where the international agenda is not defined exclusively by Western institutions.
  • And this is precisely where India and China find themselves in an unusual position.
  1. They agree that the international system should give greater weight to emerging powers. 
  2. They both seek a stronger voice for the Global South. 
  3. They are both major engines of global economic growth.
  4. Yet they compete for influence across Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Himalayas and the wider developing world.
  • BRICS therefore does not eliminate their rivalry, but creates a framework within which that rivalry can be managed.

From Peaceful Coexistence to Competitive Coexistence

  • India's 2026 BRICS chairship is guided by the theme-
“Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”, with the broader objective of strengthening cooperation across political-security, economic-financial and people-to-people dimensions.
  • That agenda matters because today's geopolitical environment is creating incentives for countries to cooperate even when strategic trust is limited.
  • Trade wars, sanctions, armed conflicts, supply-chain disruptions and economic-security concerns have made complete strategic separation increasingly difficult.
  • India and China are experiencing this contradiction directly. One fact-check of that is, yes, China remains an important economic partner for India, but New Delhi is simultaneously determined to reduce excessive strategic dependence. The lesson of Galwan was- 
"Economic interdependence does not automatically generate political trust."
  • The likely future, therefore, is not a return to the old idea of uncomplicated friendship; rather, it may instead be "competitive coexistence."
  • India and China will continue competing. They will continue disagreeing over the boundary, regional influence and the balance of power in Asia. But they may also recognize that "unmanaged hostility" carries enormous economic, military and geopolitical costs.
  • That is where BRICS can matter.
  1. It cannot redraw the Line of Actual Control. 
  2. It cannot settle decades-old territorial claims. 
  3. It cannot manufacture trust.
  4. But it can keep the leaders talking.
  • And in diplomacy, sustained communication is not a minor achievement.
  • The real test of the New Delhi summit will therefore not be the photograph of Modi and Xi standing together. It will be whether that political engagement contributes to a relationship in which-
  1. disagreements remain manageable, 
  2. economic engagement becomes more predictable, and 
  3. competition does not automatically escalate into confrontation.
  • The old dream was peaceful coexistence. The emerging reality may be more pragmatic: competitive coexistence between two Asian powers that recognize that they cannot ignore each other—and cannot afford to let rivalry become permanent hostility.
  • That may be the most realistic promise BRICS can offer India and China in New Delhi.
Thanks.
Critical Comments are welcome.


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