From “Bharat” to a Multipolar World: Jaishankar’s UNGA 2026 Doctrine of Peace and Reformed Multilateralism

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Hydrocarbons and Geopolitics: How India Is Recalibrating Among Russia, America and Europe

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The Energy Question Behind a Wider India–U.S. Strategic Recalibration

  • The latest India–United States tensions are no longer confined to tariffs, trade negotiations or defence cooperation. Energy has emerged as one of the most consequential points of friction. 
        "At the centre of the dispute is India's continuing dependence on imported hydrocarbons, particularly Russian crude, and Washington's growing willingness to use trade policy and sanctions legislation to influence the energy options of respective countries."
  • The issue became especially visible during the "81st United Nations General Assembly in New York," where "Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar" met "U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio" on 23 September 2026. Jaishankar said afterwards that he had reiterated India's “interests and concerns” regarding "the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, or SRIA."
  • The meeting came only days after U.S. President Donald Trump signed the SRIA into law on 18 September. The legislation gives the U.S. president authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries that continue "significant purchases" of Russian oil and gas. Importantly, however, a 100% tariff is not automatically imposed on India by the law. The legislation creates presidential authority and a process to be effective, with implementation and exemptions remaining matters of executive action.
  • For India, therefore, the issue is not simply whether it can purchase Russian energy. It is whether an external power can make those purchases sufficiently expensive by attaching consequences to India's exports to the American market.


Why Hydrocarbons Matter So Much to India

  • India's energy requirement is fundamentally linked to development. With a population exceeding 1.4 billion and a rapidly expanding economy, oil and gas remain critical to transport, industry, petrochemicals, fertilisers, urbanisation and household energy.
  • Jaishankar made this point precisely on the sidelines of the UNGA when he said that “energy security is at the heart of development” and that energy availability and prices should not be manipulated for "political ends."
  • This explains why New Delhi's approach to Russian energy has generally been presented as "an economic and strategic calculation" rather than an ideological alignment. India remains highly dependent on imported crude: its crude-oil import dependence reached about 88% in 2026, according to recent government-linked reporting.
      

  • In the context of the above infographics, Russian crude became particularly important because it offered Indian refiners an additional source of supply and, during much of the post-2022 period, "competitive pricing." Even in August 2026, Russia remained India's largest crude supplier, although Indian imports from Russia had fallen to approximately 2.1 million barrels per day, with preliminary September flows lower still.
  • Thus, the Russian-oil question cannot be separated from India's broader objective of maintaining "affordable and diversified energy supplies."



The Global Energy Arithmetic Explains the Strategic Tension

  • The infographics accompanying this analysis provide a useful way of understanding why energy has become such a powerful geopolitical instrument.

  • Europe, excluding Russia, represents roughly 7.2% of the world population, but its share of global hydrocarbon production is considerably smaller: approximately 3.3% of global oil production and 5.0% of natural-gas production in the 2025 data set. At the same time, Europe accounts for approximately 13.8% of global oil consumption and 11.4% of global natural-gas consumption. The resulting "structural gap" helps explain Europe's continuing dependence on international energy markets. "The Energy Institute's 2026 Statistical Review" similarly identifies Europe as highly import-dependent, with oil imports meeting roughly three-quarters of its supply.
  • Russia presents almost the reverse picture.

  • With only around 1.7% of the world's population, Russia accounted for approximately 10.3% of global oil production and 16.2% of global natural-gas production in the 2025 figures used in the accompanying graphics. Russia therefore possesses "an energy-production capacity" vastly larger than its domestic demographic weight.
      

  • The United States is another "major structural outlier." Its approximately 4.2% share of world population contrasts with roughly 22.1% of global oil production and 25.1% of global natural-gas production in the 2025 data. Yet the United States also consumes enormous quantities: around 18.7% of global oil consumption and 18.8% of global natural-gas consumption. The result is a country that is simultaneously a massive producer, consumer, importer and exporter. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that American total energy exports reached a record 31 quadrillion British thermal units in 2025, while energy imports were about 21 quadrillion Btu.
  • This is why the American position in the global energy system is fundamentally different from India's.



The U.S. Hydrocarbon Surplus—and Where It Can Go


  • The accompanying calculations estimate "the U.S. production-minus-consumption difference" at approximately 3.4 percentage points of global oil production and 6.3 percentage points of global natural-gas production.
  • These numbers should be understood as an analytical calculation rather than an official U.S. government definition of an “export surplus.” They compare U.S. production and consumption against the global denominator.
  • When U.S. exports to major destinations are then expressed against world production, the arithmetic becomes revealing.
  • For oil, approximately 0.30 percentage points of global production corresponded to U.S. crude exports to India in the 2025 calculation, leaving approximately 3.10 percentage points of the original 3.4-point U.S. surplus after the India comparison. For the European Union, the corresponding export flow was calculated at approximately 1.72 percentage points, leaving approximately 1.68 percentage points.
  • For natural gas, the equivalent calculation gives approximately 0.10 percentage points associated with India and 2.53 percentage points associated with "the European Union." Against the original 6.3-point U.S. gas surplus, that leaves approximately 6.20 percentage points after the India comparison and 3.77 percentage points after the European comparison.
  • These figures should not be interpreted as literal physical barrels or molecules sitting in a warehouse waiting for export. The United States itself imports and exports energy simultaneously. EIA data show that the country remained a major petroleum importer even while setting export records.
  • The broader point is nevertheless important: the United States possesses substantial export capacity and has become an increasingly important supplier to Europe and other markets.



Europe Is Both a Competitor and a Major Customer of the U.S.

  • Europe's energy position makes the geopolitical contradiction particularly interesting.
  • The continent has been reducing its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, but replacing Russian supply requires "alternative producers." The United States has become one of those suppliers, particularly in LNG. "European Commission" data show that in 2025 the EU imported around 289 bcm of natural gas, with the United States supplying approximately 76 bcm, broadly one-third of EU gas imports. The United States was also the world's largest LNG exporter in 2025.
  • At the same time, Europe remains a major destination for U.S. crude and petroleum products.
  • India occupies a different position in this market. India is not merely an energy consumer; it is also a major refining centre and exporter of finished petroleum products. In 2025, Europe was "India's second-largest destination" for petroleum products, accounting for approximately 21% of India's fuel exports, which is near about 02% of Europe's total consumption.
  • That creates an important distinction between crude oil and finished petroleum products. India may import crude from one supplier, refine it domestically, and subsequently sell finished products into entirely different markets. Consequently, the origin of crude and the destination of refined products are not necessarily the same.

The Russia–India–Europe Energy Triangle

  • This is where the debate over India's Russian oil purchases becomes more complicated.
  • India's 12-month calculation for October 2024–September 2025 showed Russian crude accounting for approximately 33.8% of India's total oil consumption, while Russian LNG accounted for approximately 9.5% of natural-gas consumption in the accompanying analytical framework. The combined hydrocarbon calculation produced an estimated 30.6% Russian share.
  • These are historical calculations for that specific 12-month period, not current September 2026 figures. The latest available data show that Russia's share has subsequently fluctuated as Indian refiners diversified their purchases.
  • The relationship with Europe adds another layer. India has been a major exporter of refined petroleum products to European markets. European demand for Indian diesel and jet fuel became especially visible during the transition away from Russian refined products. "Reuters" reported that India's jet-fuel exports to the EU were again reaching significant levels in 2026, while earlier 2025 flows had been substantially higher.
  • The distinction matters because the statement “India buys Russian oil and sells it to Europe” can be too simplistic. Indian refineries process crude from multiple origins, and European rules increasingly distinguish between crude origin and the subsequent refining process.

The European Criticism of India's Russian Energy Purchases

  • European criticism of India's Russian energy purchases is nevertheless real.
  • European institutions have repeatedly argued that continuing purchases of Russian fuel are a primary source of revenue to Russia. A "2026 European Parliament resolution," for example, called for stronger measures to stop European money from flowing into Russia's economy and pointed to continuing Russian fuel purchases by EU member states. The same resolution noted that some European countries were still buying Russian fossil fuels.
  • This creates an "obvious political argument" that India and other third countries should reduce their purchases as well.
         "But the counterargument raised in India is that energy markets cannot simply be separated from affordability, supply security and development requirements. India has therefore resisted the idea that its energy procurement should be determined by another country's geopolitical preferences."
  • The disagreement is not merely about Russia. It is about who gets to determine the acceptable boundaries of "energy commerce" in a fragmented global economy.

The U.S. Position Is More Complicated Than a Simple Sanctions Narrative

  • There is also an important complication in Washington's own relationship with Moscow.
  • It would be inaccurate to say that the United States conducts normal unrestricted trade with Russia. The U.S. maintains extensive sanctions on Russia. Yet sanctions have not eliminated every commercial transaction. U.S. goods and services trade with Russia still totalled an estimated $5.9 billion in 2025, including approximately $3.8 billion of U.S. goods imports from Russia.
  • The remaining trade includes commodities and products that have not been completely prohibited or have operated under specific exemptions or regulatory arrangements. Russian "uranium" is a particularly important example historically, although the United States legislated to prohibit Russian uranium imports from August 2024 while allowing a waiver mechanism through 2027.
  • Therefore, the more precise description is not that America has “no trade with Russia,” but that Washington has imposed extensive sanctions while allowing some remaining trade and regulated exceptions.
  • That distinction is important in any international discussion of double standards.

Tariffs Became the Second Front of the India–U.S. Dispute

  • The energy dispute has unfolded alongside a difficult trade negotiation.
  • In February 2026, Washington and New Delhi announced a framework for an interim trade agreement under which the U.S. would apply an "18% reciprocal tariff rate" to specified Indian goods, subject to the successful conclusion of the agreement.
  • But the final agreement has not yet been implemented. India's Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal has repeatedly said that New Delhi wants a "tariff advantage over competing exporters" before finalising the agreement. In September, he described the deal as essentially negotiated but still dependent on obtaining a competitive tariff framework from Washington.
  • The legal background is also significant. In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down President Trump's broad IEEPA-based tariffs, holding that the law did not authorise the president to impose tariffs in the manner used. The administration subsequently pursued alternative statutory routes, including "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."


The Section 301 Investigations: What Has Actually Happened?

  • Two U.S. Section 301 tracks mentioned in the discussion are particularly relevant.
  • The first concerned forced-labour import prohibitions and covered 60 economies, including India, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and the European Union. In July 2026, the U.S. imposed Section 301 tariffs following the investigation. For India, the final rate under that action was 10%, not simply an unspecified 10% applied to all 60 economies; other economies received different rates, including 12.5%.
  • The second investigation concerns "structural excess capacity and manufacturing overproduction." It covers 16 economies, including India, China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union. As of September 2026, this investigation remains a separate process; it should not be described as though a final additional 8% tariff has already been imposed under that investigation.
  • This distinction matters because the original 18% calculation in the discussion combined a 10% forced-labour tariff with an assumed additional 8% excess-capacity tariff. The latter was not yet a final tariff action as of 26 September 2026.

India Is Diversifying Its Options

  • New Delhi's negotiating position is also supported by a broader diversification strategy.
  • India has expanded or advanced trade arrangements with countries including the United Kingdom and New Zealand, while negotiations with Canada have resumed and the India–EU trade relationship has been moving forward. The India–New Zealand FTA, signed in April 2026, is scheduled to enter into force on 20 October 2026, while Canada and India have committed to advancing CEPA negotiations.
  • Indian merchandise exports have also remained resilient. Goods exports rose strongly during 2026, with the Commerce Ministry reporting growth of more than 15% in the first half of September and 17.85% year-on-year growth during April–August.
  • This gives India additional markets and negotiating alternatives, even though the United States remains an important export destination.

The Larger Geopolitical Question: Can Strategic Partnerships Remain Transactional?

  • The India–U.S. relationship is therefore entering a more transactional phase.
  • For years, Washington and New Delhi deepened strategic cooperation partly because both saw value in responding to China's growing economic and military weight. India purchased U.S. defence equipment, energy and other strategic products, while Washington viewed India as an important partner in the Indo-Pacific.
  • But the "strategic environment" is changing.
  • At the same time that India and the United States were debating Russian energy, Washington was preparing for and then hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Trump–Xi state visit took place on 24–25 September 2026, with trade, technology, artificial intelligence, Taiwan and broader strategic stability among the issues under discussion. The White House described the visit as advancing American economic interests and bilateral stability.
  • That does not mean that Washington has abandoned competition with Beijing. China remains the United States' "principal geopolitical and economic competitor in many assessments." But the willingness of the two governments to maintain high-level dialogue and negotiate economic issues demonstrates that competition and cooperation can coexist.
  • For India, this reinforces an established principle of "strategic autonomy": partnerships can be deep, but they need not become exclusive alignments.

A New Energy Geometry

  • The emerging picture is therefore more complex than a simple India–Russia–U.S. dispute.
  1. Europe needs imported hydrocarbons despite its energy transition. 
  2. Russia remains a major global producer despite sanctions. 
  3. The United States has become one of the world's largest hydrocarbon producers and exporters. 
  4. India is simultaneously a major energy importer and a major refining and petroleum-product exporter.
  • The numbers make the underlying structure clear. 
  1. Europe, excluding Russia, consumes a much larger share of global oil and gas than it produces. 
  2. Russia produces a much larger share than its population would suggest. 
  3. The United States produces enormous quantities while also consuming enormous quantities. 
     "India sits on the opposite side of the equation: its economic development requires large and increasingly diversified energy imports."
  • The result is a world in which energy security, trade policy and geopolitics are becoming inseparable.
  1. For India, Russian hydrocarbons are not merely a question of political friendship with Moscow. 
  2. For Europe, reducing Russian energy dependence is not merely an economic decision. 
  3. For the United States, energy exports have become both a commercial opportunity and a strategic instrument.
  • And for all three, the central question is increasingly the same: how much should national energy security be allowed to depend on geopolitical alignment?
  • The answer will shape not only India–U.S. relations, but also the wider architecture of "global energy trade."

Thanks. 
Critical comments are welcome.


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