From “Bharat” to a Multipolar World: Jaishankar’s UNGA 2026 Doctrine of Peace and Reformed Multilateralism

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Saudi Arabia Under Pressure: The Houthi Offensive, the Red Sea Chokepoint and MBS’s Strategic Test

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A New Front in West Asia’s Expanding Saudi Arabia-Yemen War

  • It was another day of escalation in West Asia, but this time the pressure on Saudi Arabia was becoming increasingly difficult to contain. 
  1. More missiles and drones were being launched.
  2. More people were being displaced.
  • The Saudi Arabia-Yemen conflict was once again spilling directly into the security calculations of the region’s largest Arab economy. The Houthi movement’s rapidly expanding offensive has pushed Riyadh into an increasingly urgent search for diplomatic, military and strategic support.
  • The immediate trigger was another wave of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory. Saudi authorities reported attacks affecting several cities and said 13 civilians had been injured. The Houthis, meanwhile, claimed responsibility for attacks on Saudi military and strategic targets, including the "Khamis Mushait area." Saudi Arabia responded with extensive air operations against Houthi positions inside Yemen. Reports on the scale of the strikes have varied, but the response has been substantial and has included attacks across several Yemeni governorates.
  • What made the latest escalation particularly significant, however, was not simply the number of missiles or airstrikes. It was the geography. Saudi Arabia began issuing unusually broad security alerts, including warnings affecting Mecca, Jeddah and other cities. On 15 September, Saudi Civil Defence announced that danger had passed in several locations after emergency alerts were issued. The following day, Saudi authorities said they had intercepted and destroyed a Houthi drone south of Mecca before it entered restricted airspace over the holy city. The Houthis denied targeting Mecca itself.
  • That distinction matters. Mecca is not simply another Saudi city. It is the holiest city in Islam, home to the Grand Mosque and the Kaaba and the destination of millions of Muslim pilgrims. Any military incident in its vicinity therefore carries a "symbolic and political significance" far beyond the immediate battlefield. Saudi authorities have now explicitly described the security of Mecca as a “red line.”


The Battlefield Is Moving South and West

  • To understand why Riyadh is under such pressure, we have to return to the map of Yemen.

  • Yemen has been divided by years of civil war and political fragmentation. The Houthi movement, formally "Ansar Allah," controls much of the north and west, including the capital Sanaa, while the internationally recognized "Yemeni authorities and allied forces" have maintained control over parts of the south and east. Iran has provided extensive political and military support to the Houthis, although Tehran continues to describe Ansar Allah as-
        "an independent Yemeni movement whose decisions are its own."
  • The current offensive represents a major change because the Houthis have moved beyond their traditional territorial base and made dramatic gains along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline. They captured the strategically important port of "Mocha" and subsequently advanced towards the "Hanish islands" and the "Bab el-Mandeb Strait." 
  • Their territorial expansion has therefore transformed the conflict from another episode of Yemen’s civil war into a direct challenge to Saudi Arabia’s maritime and energy security.
  • Two areas remain particularly important for understanding the ground war: "Ma’rib" and "Taiz". As already shown in the above infographics, Ma’rib is strategically important because of its oil and gas resources and its position between Houthi-controlled territory and the eastern and southern parts of Yemen. Taiz is equally significant because of its geographical position linking Yemen’s interior with the Red Sea coast.
  • The fighting has consequently become a combination of-
  1. ground warfare, 
  2. missile warfare and 
  3. air warfare. 
  • Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on air power rather than committing a large conventional ground force of its own. Saudi and Yemeni government aircraft have struck Houthi positions, while Houthi missiles and drones have targeted Saudi territory and infrastructure. "Reuters" reported that Saudi-led forces had carried out hundreds of strikes during the latest escalation, illustrating the intensity of the campaign.

The Human Cost: Yemenis Are Moving Again

  • The military map is changing, but the humanitarian map is changing even faster.
  1. More than 100,000 Yemenis have been internally displaced during the latest escalation, according to UN reporting. 
  2. Earlier, "IOM" figures recorded more than 85,000 displaced people by 13 September, with more than 2,000 people already crossing the sea to northern Djibouti. 
  3. "The United Nations" subsequently reported approximately 2,300 arrivals in Djibouti's Obock region.
  • For civilians, crossing the sea from Yemen to "Djibouti" is itself a dangerous undertaking. Yet families are making that journey because the alternative is remaining inside an expanding war zone.
  • This is therefore not simply a Saudi-Houthi military confrontation. It is a "humanitarian crisis" unfolding alongside "a strategic contest" over territory, energy infrastructure and maritime chokepoints.

The Real Strategic Prize: Bab el-Mandeb

  • The most consequential development may not be happening over Saudi cities at all. It is happening around the "Bab el-Mandeb Strait." 
  • Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Ships travelling between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal normally pass through this maritime gateway. For Saudi Arabia, the strait has acquired additional importance because the kingdom's western Red Sea ports provide "an alternative route for energy exports" when the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted.
  • That is why the Houthi advance along Yemen's Red Sea coast is so strategically important. 
    The Houthis are now positioned close to one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints, and their seizure of Mocha and strategic islands has increased their leverage over the maritime environment even if they have not attempted to completely close international shipping.
  • This is where the crisis becomes global.
  • If Bab el-Mandeb were seriously disrupted, the consequences would extend far beyond Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
  1. European-Asian trade would face longer routes and higher transportation costs.
  2. Energy markets would become even more vulnerable. 
  3. Egypt would be particularly exposed because the Suez Canal depends on the security of the Red Sea system.
  • That explains why Qatar has warned that disruption of Bab el-Mandeb would be catastrophic. The concern is not merely regional. It is about adding another maritime chokepoint crisis to an already deeply disrupted "global energy and shipping system."

Riyadh Looks for Allies

  • This is where Saudi Arabia's diplomatic problem becomes visible.
  • "Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman" has already sought assistance from Washington. According to Reuters and other reporting, MBS spoke with "the U.S. President Donald Trump" twice and pressed for direct American military action against the Houthis. Still, Trump did not agree to direct U.S. strikes, although Washington has provided intelligence and targeting support and maintained military coordination with Riyadh.
  • The distinction is important. Saudi Arabia is not completely without American support. What Riyadh has not received is the direct military intervention it was reportedly seeking.
  • "The United Kingdom" has also condemned the Houthi attacks and reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government. "British-Saudi defence cooperation" has also continued, including the appointment of a British defence envoy to Saudi Arabia. However, the available public evidence does not support the claim that "Prime Minister Andy Burnham" has sent military advisers to fight alongside Saudi forces.
  • The most consequential diplomatic move came on 15 September 2026, when MBS travelled to Cairo to meet "Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi." 
  1. Egypt possesses one of the region's largest armed forces.
  2. More importantly, it has a direct strategic interest in the security of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. 
  3. Egypt has already suffered major economic consequences from disruption of Red Sea shipping.
  • Cairo therefore has a strong reason to support maritime security. But political support for Riyadh does not automatically mean Egyptian troops will enter Yemen.

The Mecca Pact and the Limits of Regional Solidarity

  • The Egyptian visit also highlights an "extraordinary reversal."
  • In August, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan created "the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement." The agreement states that an armed attack against one member would be regarded as an attack against all three. Egypt was subsequently discussed as a possible future participant, particularly because of its military strength, geographical position and control of the Suez Canal.
  • Yet when the Houthi attacks intensified, Pakistan clarified that no immediate military response under the pact had been discussed. That demonstrates the difference between creating "a collective-defence framework" on paper and deciding to fight a war in practice.
  • "The UAE" presents another complication. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were once major partners in the Yemen intervention, but their interests diverged sharply over southern Yemen. In December 2025, Saudi forces struck a shipment at "Mukalla" that Riyadh said contained weapons destined for UAE-backed separatists. The UAE denied the Saudi allegations but subsequently announced the withdrawal of its remaining personnel from Yemen after a Saudi-backed demand for their departure.
  • So if Riyadh now wants Abu Dhabi to return to the battlefield, that would require overcoming a serious political rupture.

Iran and the Houthi Factor

  • There is also a "diplomatic route: Iran."
  • Tehran possesses "considerable influence" over the Houthis. Iran publicly insists that Ansar Allah makes its own decisions, and there is a degree of truth in the distinction between Iranian support and direct Iranian command. Yet Iran's military, political and technological assistance has been an important factor in the Houthis' ability to sustain their campaign.
  • That gives Tehran leverage. A negotiated understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran could potentially reduce attacks on Saudi territory. But such diplomacy would require concessions from both sides, and the Houthis currently possess "battlefield momentum and a powerful strategic card" in the form of their proximity to Bab el-Mandeb.
  • The central question is therefore: 
         "Whether Riyadh chooses further escalation or attempts to negotiate from a position of mounting pressure?"


The MBS Problem: Vision 2030 Meets a Hard Security Reality

  • This brings us to "Mohammed bin Salman himself."
  • MBS built his political identity around transformation. Saudi Arabia was supposed to move beyond 
  1. oil dependence, 
  2. diversify its economy, 
  3. attract foreign investment and 
  4. become a technologically advanced global centre. 
  • "NEOM" became the most spectacular symbol of that ambition.
  • The most famous component was The Line, originally presented as a 170-kilometre-long, 500-metre-high and 200-metre-wide linear city designed to accommodate up to nine million people. NEOM itself continues to describe those dimensions as part of the project's original vision.
  • The problem was not simply ambition. It was cost and feasibility.
  • Investigative reporting has indicated that internal estimates associated with the full end-state of NEOM reached approximately $8.8 trillion by 2080, although this was an internal estimate rather than an official public Saudi budget figure, and NEOM has disputed interpretations of some of the reporting. The project has subsequently undergone major scaling and scheduling changes.
  • Now "the geopolitical environment" has become another variable. Investors do not assess a megaproject only by engineering feasibility. They also assess political stability, security, insurance costs, energy availability and the possibility that infrastructure could become a target during a regional war.
       "The question is therefore no longer simply whether Saudi Arabia can build futuristic cities in the desert. It is whether investors will continue to believe that the kingdom can provide the strategic stability necessary to support them."


The Trump Bet

  • MBS also placed a major geopolitical bet on the United States, particularly on Donald Trump.
  • During Trump's first presidency, the two countries announced enormous "investment and defence packages." Trump repeatedly cited a $450 billion figure, while the U.S. government separately described almost $110 billion in defence capabilities under "the 2017 package."
  • After Trump left office, Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund committed $2 billion to Jared Kushner's investment firm, Affinity Partners.
  • Saudi Arabia also continued deepening economic ties with the United States. In 2025, MBS announced plans for $600 billion in additional U.S. investment and trade over four years, with the possibility of a larger figure.
  • And yet, when Riyadh sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September 2026, Washington stopped short of direct strikes.
  • That is the "strategic dilemma."
  • Saudi Arabia has not received “nothing” from its relationship with Washington: it has extensive defence cooperation, intelligence support, arms relationships and diplomatic engagement. But the present crisis demonstrates that economic interdependence and defence cooperation do not automatically translate into an American willingness to fight a new war on Saudi Arabia's behalf.

The Larger Question- The Conclusion

  • There is also a much more personal political question surrounding MBS's leadership. He is still only 41, having risen to extraordinary political influence in his thirties. His leadership has been associated with a remarkable appetite for risk: 
  • "the Yemen intervention", 
  • "the confrontation with regional rivals", 
  • the ambitious NEOM programme" and 
  • "the effort to reshape Saudi Arabia's international economic relationships."
  • His record has also remained controversial because of the killing of Saudi journalist "Jamal Khashoggi." A UN Special Rapporteur concluded in 2019 that there was credible evidence warranting further investigation of the individual liability of senior Saudi officials, including the Crown Prince; Saudi Arabia rejected those findings.
  • None of these episodes, taken individually, determines Saudi Arabia's future. Together, however, they illustrate the governing philosophy associated with MBS: move quickly, take large risks and attempt to transform the strategic environment rather than simply adapt to it.
  • Now that philosophy is facing its most serious test.
  1. The Houthis are advancing. 
  2. Saudi cities are under attack. 
  3. Mecca has entered the security equation. 
  4. Bab el-Mandeb is under unprecedented pressure. 
  5. Yemen is again generating mass displacement. 
  6. Egypt is being asked to help build a regional response. 
  7. Pakistan is cautious about activating its new defence pact. 
  8. The United States is providing support but avoiding direct intervention. 
  9. And Iran retains influence over one of Riyadh's most dangerous adversaries.
  • The next phase will therefore determine much more than the outcome of another battle in Yemen. 
       "It will test whether Saudi Arabia's emerging model of strategic autonomy can withstand a major regional war—and whether Mohammed bin Salman's vision of a transformed Saudi Arabia can survive the return of hard geopolitical reality."
  • For Riyadh, the central challenge is no longer simply defeating the Houthis. It is finding a way to-
  1. protect Saudi territory, 
  2. preserve energy exports, 
  3. secure the Red Sea, 
  4. maintain investor confidence and 
  5. rebuild regional partnerships without triggering a wider war.
  • That is a much larger challenge than Yemen alone.

Thanks.
Critical comments are welcome.






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