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Saudi Arabia Reaches Out to the Houthis: Can China and Oman Stop the Yemen War?

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Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Gamble: China, Oman and the Houthi Question

  • More than a decade after the Yemen war began, Saudi Arabia is again turning toward diplomacy. After a sharp escalation involving Houthi attacks, Saudi airstrikes, fighting along Yemen's Red Sea coast and damage to critical Saudi energy infrastructure, Riyadh is reportedly seeking "a temporary ceasefire" with the Houthis through "Oman" while simultaneously asking "China" to use its influence with Iran.
  • The reported Saudi proposal is for a two-week halt to hostilities followed by direct talks with the Houthi leadership, with humanitarian issues—including restrictions affecting Houthi-controlled Yemen—placed on the negotiating table. The report originated with "Lebanon's Al-Akhbar," a newspaper associated with Hezbollah, so the proposal should be treated as a reported diplomatic initiative rather than a formally confirmed peace agreement.
  • The diplomatic movement comes as the military situation has changed dramatically. The Houthis have advanced along Yemen's Red Sea coast, captured strategically important territory and increased pressure around the "Bab el-Mandeb Strait," while Saudi Arabia has responded with airstrikes. Reuters also reports that the United States held "previously undisclosed talks" with Houthi representatives in Oman over the weekend, adding another diplomatic channel to an already crowded mediation effort.
  • The central question is therefore no longer simply-
        "why are the Houthis attacking Saudi Arabia?"

  • It is whether Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Oman and the United States can prevent Yemen from becoming another major front in the "wider West Asian war."


Saudi Arabia's New Search for a Way Out

  • The scale of the latest escalation explains Riyadh's "diplomatic outreach." The fighting has involved sustained Saudi air operations and renewed ground combat, while Houthi forces have pushed toward strategically important areas along the Red Sea.

  • The conflict has also moved beyond Yemen's battlefield. A drone attack damaged Saudi Arabia's 1,200-kilometre East-West oil pipeline, a crucial route designed to move Saudi crude from the Gulf coast toward the Red Sea port of "Yanbu" and thereby reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Riyadh temporarily shut the pipeline after the attack. Reuters reported that the attack originated in Iraq, where Iranian-backed militias operate, rather than being directly attributed to the Houthis.
  • That distinction matters. The latest crisis is not simply a Saudi-Houthi confrontation. It is increasingly "a networked regional conflict" involving-
  1. Iran, 
  2. Iraq-based militias, 
  3. the Houthis, 
  4. Saudi Arabia, 
  5. the United States, and 
  6. "the strategic waterways" connecting the Persian Gulf with the Red Sea.
  • The consequences are global. The East-West pipeline had become particularly important because the war had severely disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Damage to that alternative route therefore created another vulnerability for Saudi oil exports and contributed to renewed volatility in global energy markets.

Two Diplomatic Tracks: China and Oman

  • Saudi Arabia's reported diplomatic strategy appears to be developing along two parallel tracks.
  • The first runs through China and Iran. Reports say Riyadh has asked Beijing to use its influence over Tehran to restrain the Houthis. The logic is straightforward: if Iran can influence Houthi military decision-making, then pressure on Tehran could potentially create space for a Saudi-Houthi ceasefire.
  • During Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi's visit to Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi publicly urged restraint and called for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the restoration of diplomacy. Reuters reported that Wang pressed for restraint in his discussions with the Iranian side.
  • But there is an important limitation. China can exert influence over Iran, but influence is not the same as command. The Houthis are Iran-aligned and receive Iranian support, but describing them simply as Iranian "proxies" can obscure the group's own political and military agency. Tehran's relationship with the Houthis is significant, but the movement does not necessarily act as a "conventional subordinate force": receiving every operational order from Iran.
  • Iran's public position has also focused on the wider "U.S.-Iran conflict" rather than accepting responsibility for ending Houthi operations.

Why China Has Leverage Over Iran

  • China nevertheless possesses substantial leverage.
  • China is Iran's most important economic partner and a major buyer of Iranian oil. Beijing also maintains extensive commercial, technological and diplomatic relationships with Tehran. Most importantly, China has demonstrated that it can sometimes bring Saudi Arabia and Iran into the same diplomatic framework.
  • In 2023, China brokered the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, in which the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations after years of hostility. That agreement demonstrated that Beijing could operate as a mediator between two major Middle Eastern rivals.
  • China also has a powerful economic reason to prevent further escalation. A prolonged confrontation involving "the Strait of Hormuz" and "Bab el-Mandeb" threatens energy supplies and maritime commerce on which China's manufacturing economy depends.
  • But Beijing's interests do not necessarily coincide with Riyadh's.
  • China wants stable trade routes and energy markets, but it also maintains a strategic relationship with Iran. The Chinese position therefore appears more likely to favour "de-escalation and negotiations" than an effort to isolate or destabilise the Iranian regime.
  • That became particularly visible at the United Nations Security Council on September 17, when China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-backed resolution seeking to extend independent monitoring of sanctions on Iran. The vote was 11 in favour, two against and two abstentions, but the Chinese and Russian vetoes prevented adoption.
  • This illustrates an important Chinese red line: 
        "Beijing may encourage Tehran to exercise restraint, but it is not automatically willing to support measures that Washington believes will increase pressure on Iran."


The Oman Track: Direct Contact With the Houthis

  • The second diplomatic track is much more direct.
  • According to reports, Saudi Arabia has sent a message to the Houthis through "Oman," proposing a two-week ceasefire followed by direct negotiations. The proposal reportedly includes discussions of humanitarian demands and restrictions affecting Yemen.
  • Oman's role is especially important because Muscat has repeatedly served as a diplomatic channel between the Houthis and outside governments.
  • The latest development goes beyond Saudi-Houthi communication. Reuters reports that U.S. officials also met Houthi representatives in Oman over the weekend. The talks were reportedly aimed at preventing further escalation and preserving maritime security.
  • This creates an unusual diplomatic landscape in which Oman is simultaneously useful to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis and Washington.

Why the Houthi Blockade Demand Matters

  • One of the most important Houthi demands concerns what the movement describes as a Saudi blockade or siege of Yemen.
  • Houthi leaders have repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of imposing restrictions on northern Yemen for almost 12 years. Their political narrative presents the war as a Saudi-led aggression and portrays restrictions on ports, airports and trade as a central cause of Yemen's humanitarian suffering.
  • However, describing northern Yemen as an area where "nothing comes in" is too absolute. Saudi Arabia rejects the characterization of a "comprehensive blockade" and says commercial and humanitarian shipments have continued. Saudi authorities said more than 300 commercial vessels carrying food, fuel, construction materials and other goods entered northern Yemeni ports during the first half of 2026.
  • The dispute over terminology is politically significant because lifting or easing restrictions has become one of the Houthis' central demands.
  • For Riyadh, however, the question is what concessions can be made without creating a security environment in which the Houthis emerge with greater military control over Yemen's western coastline and the Bab el-Mandeb.

The Strategic Prize: Bab el-Mandeb

    


  • This is where the geography of Yemen becomes crucial.
  • The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. In 2024, around 4.1 billion barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the waterway—roughly 5% of global petroleum flows.
  • For Saudi Arabia, Bab el-Mandeb has become even more important because the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted during the wider "U.S.-Iran conflict."
  • This creates a "strategic dilemma." Iran has leverage around Hormuz, while the Houthis possess geographic access to Bab el-Mandeb. Together, the two chokepoints connect the Persian Gulf and Red Sea dimensions of the conflict.
  • That is why the Yemen war cannot be understood as an isolated civil war.

Can Saudi Arabia Reach a Ceasefire With the Houthis?

  • Whether the proposed two-week truce succeeds will depend on at least three factors.
  • First, Iran's position matters. If Tehran supports de-escalation, the Houthis may have greater room to negotiate. But the Houthis retain their own interests and decision-making capacity.
  • Second, Saudi concessions will be decisive. Riyadh may have to address humanitarian and economic restrictions, but the scale of any concession remains unclear.
  • Third, battlefield momentum matters. The Houthis have recently made major advances along Yemen's western coast, while anti-Houthi forces have suffered significant reversals. Reuters reported that more than 115,000 people have been displaced by the renewed fighting, demonstrating how quickly the conflict has returned to large-scale humanitarian consequences.
  • A movement that believes it is winning may have less incentive to accept a temporary pause unless the proposed political and economic gains are substantial.

The Trump Factor: How Far Will Washington Escalate?

  • The fourth actor is the United States.
  • President Donald Trump has publicly indicated that he is approaching a major decision over whether to intensify military action against Iran. In an interview with Axios, Trump said he faced a choice over whether to "annihilate" the Iranian regime or refrain from doing so.
  • Trump has also repeatedly linked the conclusion of the wider Iran war to the U.S. midterm-election period in November, although the precise timing and conditions for ending the war remain uncertain.
  • For Iran, Bab el-Mandeb therefore represents another "potential bargaining instrument." If the wider conflict with Washington escalates, pressure on shipping through Yemen could become part of Tehran's "regional strategy."
  • For Saudi Arabia, that is precisely why diplomacy has become urgent.

The Bigger Geopolitical Lesson

  • The latest Saudi-Houthi diplomacy demonstrates why the Yemen conflict should not be analysed as a stand-alone confrontation.
  1. China is talking to Iran. 
  2. Oman is communicating with the Houthis. 
  3. The United States is also using Oman as a channel. 
  4. Saudi Arabia is exploring direct negotiations. 
  5. Iran is attempting to preserve strategic leverage. 
  6. And the Houthis are expanding their position along one of the world's most important maritime corridors.
  • The battlefield, therefore, extends from Yemen's provinces to the Red Sea, from Bab el-Mandeb to the Strait of Hormuz, and from Riyadh and Tehran to Beijing, Muscat and Washington.
  • "The immediate question" is whether a two-week ceasefire can stop the fighting. The larger question is whether diplomacy can separate Yemen from the wider U.S.-Iran confrontation.
  • That may be the hardest task of all.
  • For Saudi Arabia, the calculation is increasingly clear: 
  1. continued military escalation carries risks to its territory, 
  2. energy infrastructure, 
  3. economic transformation plans and maritime access. 
  • For the Houthis, battlefield gains have created new leverage but also enormous humanitarian and political responsibilities. For Iran, Yemen provides "strategic depth." For China, the priority is "regional stability" without abandoning its relationship with Tehran. And for the United States, the decision over further escalation could determine whether Yemen remains "a secondary theatre"—or becomes another major front in the wider West Asian war.
      "The next phase of the Yemen conflict may therefore be decided not only on the battlefield, but across negotiating tables in Muscat, Beijing, Riyadh and Tehran."


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