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India’s BRICS Strategic Advantages: Influence Without Choosing a Camp

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India’s Strategic Autonomy in a Divided World

  • Every BRICS summit raises the same question: 
       "What does India actually want from BRICS? Is New Delhi trying to build an alternative to the Western-led international order? Is BRICS an anti-Western coalition? Or is India simply using another multilateral forum to advance its own interests?"
  • The answer is more pragmatic. India does not view BRICS as a traditional military alliance, nor does it see the grouping as an inherently anti-Western club. For New Delhi, BRICS is primarily a platform for-
  1. influence, 
  2. markets, 
  3. development finance, 
  4. diplomatic leverage and, 
  5. above all, strategic autonomy. 
  • India’s foreign policy increasingly reflects a willingness to sit in multiple rooms simultaneously—from "BRICS" and the "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)" to partnerships with the United States, Europe and other Western powers. The objective is not necessarily to choose one camp, but to ensure that India has a voice wherever important decisions are being shaped.
  • That "balancing act" can appear contradictory in an increasingly polarised world. But for India, the question is not simply whether a new international order is emerging. The more important question is whether India can help shape that order in ways that serve its interests.
  • With this understanding, we can now examine- 
  1. why India remains in BRICS, and
  2. what BRICS means for India under the following 07 heading, as shown in the following infographics.

A- BRICS Gives India Access to Large and Expanding Markets

  • The most obvious benefit is economic. BRICS now comprises eleven countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia. 
  1. Collectively, they represent roughly 49.5% of the world's population. 
  2. Around 40% of global GDP.
  3. About 26% of global trade, according to current Indian government figures.
  • For Indian businesses, this represents "an enormous potential market" spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Corroborated by the following infographic.
  • India already trades bilaterally with these economies, but BRICS provides an additional multilateral platform. Corroborated by the following infographic.  
  • Through this trade, investment, logistics, supply chains and economic cooperation can be discussed collectively. 
  • This was visible in 2024, when BRICS held meetings involving trade ministers and economic officials. India has consistently pushed for an open, fair and rules-based trading system, rather than an arrangement dominated by protectionism or deliberately unbalanced trade.
  • In anothe one of dimesion of, to open "untapped opportunity", yestarday, in his address at the BRICS Business Forum on 11 September 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi highlighted that, since 2014, India has entered into Free Trade Agreements with nearly 40 countries around the world. Yet, when this statement is examined in the context of India’s economic relationship with BRICS, an important paradox emerges. Among the eleven BRICS member countries, India has a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement only with the "United Arab Emirates (UAE)," through the "India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)," which came into force in May 2022. With the other BRICS economies, India’s trade relations are not supported by comparable bilateral free-trade frameworks. This reveals a significant untapped opportunity: if BRICS can progressively reduce trade barriers and develop stronger preferential or free-trade arrangements among its members, the economic benefits that India can derive from its BRICS membership could be multiplied substantially. Indeed, this is closely aligned with Prime Minister Modi’s own call at the BRICS Business Forum for a report on "removing the top ten trade barriers among BRICS countries."
  • The strategic logic is straightforward. If access to some Western markets becomes more difficult because of protectionism, geopolitical tensions or changing trade policies, India benefits from having additional markets available elsewhere. BRICS can therefore function as "a ready-made network for economic diversification."
  • But this opportunity has an obvious complication: China has enormous commercial weight inside BRICS and already possesses extensive trade relationships with many member states. Expanding India's trade within the grouping will therefore not be easy. BRICS creates opportunity, but it does not automatically create a level playing field.

B-BRICS Gives India Another Source of Development Finance

  • The second major benefit is financial. "The New Development Bank (NDB)" was established in 2015 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects.
  • For India, the NDB is more than a symbolic BRICS institution. It has become a significant source of development finance. By the end of 2023, the bank had approved 26 projects in India, covering roads, connectivity, urban mobility, water and sanitation, clean energy and other sectors.
  • India is currently the second-largest recipient, after China, of NDB financing. By 2026, NDB stated that 35 approved Indian infrastructure projects represented approximately $10.5 billion in total financing, with around $6 billion already disbursed.
  • The pandemic illustrated another dimension of this relationship. NDB's India portfolio included $2 billion in COVID-19 emergency assistance, accounting for roughly 23% of India's total approved loan amount at the end of 2023.
  • Now studying upcoming infographics.
  • Although India ranks second in absolute NDB financing, the "GDP-adjusted comparison" reveals a different picture. China leads in absolute financing, but India receives financing equivalent to about 0.24% of its GDP, making it the largest recipient relative to economic size among the major BRICS economies. This perspective highlights the greater relative significance of NDB and BRICS financing for India, beyond headline monetary values.
  • The attraction is therefore not simply access to money. It is the availability of an additional "multilateral development institution" outside the traditional "Bretton Woods framework-1944." India's influence inside the NDB is also substantial: The five founding members initially held equal subscribed shares, with India accounting for 18.72% of the bank's subscribed capital.
  • That gives India considerably greater "institutional weight" there than its voting share in institutions such as the IMF or World Bank.

C-BRICS Gives India Space to Reshape Global Finance

  • For decades, international finance has been heavily influenced by institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and dollar-centred financial infrastructure. India does not advocate suddenly dismantling that system. It continues to use it extensively.
  • What New Delhi increasingly seeks are additional options.
  1. One important area is "cross-border payments." India has developed one of the world's most advanced domestic instant-payment infrastructures through "UPI" and has been pursuing international linkages between fast-payment systems. The RBI has explicitly supported "multilateral approaches" to connecting domestic fast-payment systems, including through initiatives such as "Project Nexus."
  • India's digital-rupee programme also creates possibilities for future "cross-border applications." The RBI describes the "Digital Rupee" as India's central bank digital currency and has identified cross-border payments as an area for further development.
  • The long-term objective is straightforward.
  1. Make international payments faster, 
  2. Cheaper and less dependent on cumbersome intermediaries. 
  • However, it is important not to exaggerate what BRICS has achieved. A fully "integrated BRICS-wide payment system" does not yet exist, and linking domestic payment systems or CBDCs would require substantial regulatory, technological and political coordination.
  • For India, the broader strategic benefit is the creation of alternatives. Such infrastructure could also support the "internationalisation of the rupee" by making it easier for Indian and foreign businesses to settle some transactions in local currencies.

D-BRICS Gives India Diplomatic Leverage

  • Perhaps the greatest benefit of BRICS is diplomatic rather than financial.
  • The expanded grouping brings together major economies, major energy producers and enormous populations across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. That gives India access to a much broader "diplomatic audience."
  • Many issues important to India—climate finance, development finance, sustainable development, food and energy security, trade reform and reform of global institutions—cannot be addressed effectively by India alone. BRICS allows New Delhi to build coalitions around selected issues.
  • The same applies to India's longstanding demand for reform of "the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)" and a permanent seat for India. BRICS members have broadly supported reform of global governance institutions, but BRICS support does not eliminate the political obstacles surrounding Security Council reform. In particular, China remains a major complication in India's own permanent-membership ambitions.
  • This illustrates an important characteristic of BRICS: 
       "Collective interests do not erase bilateral rivalries. India can cooperate with China inside BRICS while simultaneously disagreeing with China over the Himalayan boundary.


E-BRICS Strengthens India's Position in the Global South

  • India has long attempted to position itself as a bridge-
  1. between developed and developing economies, 
  2. between East and West, and 
  3. between the Global North and Global South.
  • The expansion of BRICS strengthens this strategy. Countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE broaden the grouping's geographical and political reach. Indonesia's entry in 2025 was particularly significant because it brought Southeast Asia's largest economy and most populous country into the grouping.
  • For India, these countries are not simply potential customers or suppliers, but are potential political and economic partners.
  • BRICS can amplify India's engagement with them through development finance, digital payments, investment, trade, infrastructure and diplomatic coordination. India does not have the resources to provide every partner with everything it needs on its own. But acting as a bridge has the potential to ensure that a multilateral platform can multiply the effect of India's diplomatic and economic initiatives.

F-BRICS Gives India a Way to Manage China

  • This may sound paradoxical because China is India's most important "strategic rival" within BRICS.
  • The two countries have a disputed Himalayan boundary, compete for influence across Asia and increasingly compete over technology, investment, manufacturing and supply chains. 
      "So why remain in the same institution?"
  • Because being inside the room can sometimes give India more leverage than staying outside it.
  • China has a strong "strategic interest" in making BRICS "an influential platform" through which developing countries can collectively challenge aspects of U.S. dominance. India does not share that objective to the same degree. Its priority is "strategic autonomy" rather than replacing one dominant bloc with another.
  • This asymmetry creates leverage.
  • India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements in "Depsang" and "Demchok" on 21 October 2024, immediately before the BRICS summit in Kazan. The agreement enabled disengagement from the remaining friction points of the 2020 crisis.
  • It would be too strong to claim that BRICS caused the "border disengagement." The negotiations were primarily a bilateral India–China process. But the timing demonstrated how wider diplomatic engagement can create additional space for bilateral interaction.
  • In another extended wing, BRICS also provides an arena where India and China can cooperate on issues where their interests overlap, such as development finance, trade, connectivity and payment technologies, even while their strategic rivalry continues elsewhere.

BRICS Gives India a Bargaining Chip

  • The most underrated benefit may be "strategic flexibility."
  • India does not agree with every BRICS member. It has-
  1. major disagreements with China, 
  2. complex relations with Iran, and 
  3. strategic partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia and other countries.
  • That is precisely why India has resisted transforming BRICS into a rigid military or ideological bloc.
  • India wants BRICS to remain a flexible platform for consultation, negotiation and cooperation. 
  1. If Washington wants Indian cooperation, India has alternatives. 
  2. If Beijing wants Indian support, India has alternatives. 
  3. If Moscow wants closer engagement, India has alternatives. 
  4. And when countries of the Global South seek Indian leadership, New Delhi has another platform through which to respond.
  • This is the essence of "strategic autonomy."
  • India's participation in BRICS does not prevent it from engaging Western institutions. But one correction is important: India does not attend the G7 as a permanent member every year, but has participated in G7 outreach and invited-partner formats, while remaining outside the seven-member group itself. That distinction matters because India's strategy is not formal membership in every major club; it is maintaining access to multiple "strategic networks."

What India Really Gets from BRICS

  • So, what does India ultimately get from BRICS?
  1. It gets markets—a vast and geographically diverse economic space. 
  2. It gets development finance through the "New Development Bank." 
  3. It gets a platform from which to experiment with new approaches to cross-border payments and financial cooperation. 
  4. It gets a larger diplomatic voice in debates over global governance. 
  5. It gets deeper access to the Global South. 
  6. It gets another channel through which to manage its complicated relationship with China. 
  7. And perhaps most importantly, it gets "strategic leverage."
  • But BRICS is not a magic solution.
  1. It cannot eliminate India's trade deficit with China. 
  2. It cannot settle the Himalayan border dispute. 
  3. It cannot transform the IMF overnight. 
  4. It cannot instantly replace the dollar. 
  5. Nor can eleven countries with very different political systems, economic structures and strategic interests suddenly behave like a "unified alliance."
  • That is precisely why India does not need BRICS to become a traditional alliance, but India needs it to remain useful.
  • In a fragmented international system, power does not always come from choosing one camp. Sometimes power comes from having a seat at several tables—and knowing how to use each seat differently.
  • For India, BRICS is one of those tables. And- 
       "New Delhi's objective is not necessarily to replace the existing international order, but to ensure that whatever new order emerges, India has enough influence, options and strategic autonomy to help shape it—and make it work in India's interests."


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