From “Bharat” to a Multipolar World: Jaishankar’s UNGA 2026 Doctrine of Peace and Reformed Multilateralism

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Modi–Xi at BRICS: From Panchsheel and Galwan to a New Geopolitical Equation

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A BRICS Meeting with Consequences Beyond India and China

  • The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi is about much more than the bilateral relationship between two Asian neighbours which are, now, considered two new giants of the GeoPoliNomic order. It brings together three different stories. 
  1. The long and complicated history of India–China relations.
  2. The gradual emergence of BRICS as a major platform of the Global South.
  3. The transformation of the international system itself.
  • For decades, India and China have moved between cooperation and confrontation. Their relationship began with-
  1. "civilisational connections" and the "idealism of Panchsheel," 
  2. passed through the trauma of "the 1962 war," 
  3. recovered through decades of diplomatic engagement and economic expansion, and 
  4. then suffered its most serious rupture in recent times after "the 2020 Galwan Valley clash." 
  • Yet the two countries have continued to sit together in BRICS and other multilateral institutions, even when their bilateral relationship has been deeply strained, and this contradiction is now becoming "strategically important." 
  • In the present context, under a changed geopolitical scenario, one can understand this relationship such as-
      "India and China do not need to resolve every disagreement before they can cooperate on selected global issues. Nor does cooperation through BRICS mean that their strategic rivalry has disappeared." 
  • The Modi–Xi meeting therefore represents something more nuanced: an attempt to place a difficult bilateral relationship within a wider framework of Global South cooperation at a time when the international order itself is changing.

India and China: Two Civilisations Before Two Modern States

  • India and China are not simply neighbouring countries created by modern geopolitics. They are among Asia's oldest civilisations, connected for centuries through Buddhism, scholarship, trade and cultural exchange. Both countries also regard themselves as major civilisational states with historical memories that extend far beyond the modern international system.
  • Their "modern diplomatic relationship" began after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. India established diplomatic relations with China in 1950, and New Delhi adopted a relatively supportive position toward China's international recognition. The early relationship was characterised by "considerable optimism."
  • That optimism reached its symbolic high point in 1954, when India and China articulated the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or Panchsheel." The principles—
  1. mutual respect for "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity"- the most controversial standout in bilateral relations. 
  2. mutual non-aggression, 
  3. non-interference, 
  4. equality and mutual benefit, and 
  5. "peaceful coexistence" - the recent red line of confrontation that was violated in Galwan in 2020.
  • —became an important diplomatic reference point for newly independent countries and the emerging Global South, but despite all this effort, the Panchsheel could not resolve the fundamental problem of the unsettled boundary.

From Panchsheel to the 1962 War

  • The deterioration of India–China relations during the late 1950s culminated in the 1962 war. The conflict transformed the psychological and strategic relationship between the two countries. The unresolved boundary question became the "central structural problem," and the "earlier idealism of the 1950s" gave way to decades of suspicion and strategic competition.
  • Yet the relationship did not remain frozen forever. Diplomatic relations were restored at the ambassadorial level in 1976, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's landmark visit to China in 1988 opened a new phase. The two sides increasingly recognised that they could not wait for a final boundary settlement before conducting all other aspects of their relationship.
  • This produced a pragmatic formula: "manage the boundary dispute while expanding cooperation elsewhere."


From Border Management to Economic Interdependence

  1. The 1993 Agreement on the "Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity- 1993" along the Line of Actual Control.
  2. The1996 "confidence-building agreement- 1996" created mechanisms to reduce the risk of military confrontation. 
  3. The 2003 visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee further advanced the relationship and established the "Special Representatives mechanism" for the boundary question. 
  4. In 2005, India and China described their relationship as a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity."
  • Economic relations expanded dramatically. Trade, investment, business links and people-to-people contacts created a degree of interdependence that would have seemed difficult to imagine after 1962.
  • But beneath this economic engagement remained a fundamental "strategic contradiction." India and China could cooperate economically and multilaterally while competing over territory, regional influence, security and the future balance of power in Asia.

Doklam, Wuhan and Mamallapuram: Managing the Contradiction

  • The 2017 Doklam standoff demonstrated how quickly border tensions could affect the wider relationship. The confrontation showed that India and China could not permanently compartmentalise territorial disputes from their broader strategic relationship.
  • The response was renewed political engagement. "The Wuhan informal summit of 2018" and the "Mamallapuram informal summit of 2019" were designed to strengthen communication between Modi and Xi and prevent strategic competition from escalating into "uncontrolled confrontation."
  • The objective was not to eliminate differences. It was to manage them. But then came Galwan.

Galwan 2020: The Moment That Changed the Relationship

  • The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash in eastern Ladakh fundamentally altered India–China relations. Twenty Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were killed, making it the deadliest India–China border confrontation in decades. The crisis produced "prolonged military deployments," a severe trust deficit and a sharp deterioration in the political and economic relationship.
  • For India, Galwan reinforced the proposition that economic interdependence could not substitute for border security. For China, the crisis demonstrated that the unresolved boundary question could not be separated from the broader strategic relationship.
  • Subsequent disengagement has helped reduce immediate military tensions, but disengagement is not the same as a final settlement. The border remains disputed, and strategic mistrust has not disappeared.
  • This is the background against which the Modi–Xi meeting at BRICS must be understood.

Why BRICS Matters to India–China Relations

  • BRICS provides something that the bilateral relationship itself cannot easily provide: a wider strategic environment in which India and China can cooperate without first resolving every bilateral disagreement.
  • "The BRICS New Delhi Declaration- 2026" reinforces this broader direction, placing cooperation across political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people pillars while calling for a "more representative and fairer international order and a reformed multilateral system."
  • This creates an "important paradox." India and China can be strategic competitors while simultaneously having an interest in making BRICS more effective.
  • For India, BRICS provides another platform for strategic autonomy and Global South diplomacy. For China, it provides an important mechanism for strengthening cooperation among emerging powers and increasing the influence of non-Western states in global governance.
  • The two countries therefore have reasons to keep BRICS functional even when their bilateral relationship remains difficult.

Modi–Xi at BRICS: Stability Before a Grand Reset

  • Against this background, the Modi–Xi meeting should not be interpreted as a "dramatic strategic realignment." It is better understood as an attempt to stabilise the relationship and create conditions for "selective cooperation."
  • Xi's visit itself was significant. It was his first visit to India in seven years, and his meeting with Modi took place directly on the margins of the BRICS Summit. The Chinese side repeatedly emphasised a strategic and long-term approach to relations, while Xi argued that India and China should draw on each other's strengths and develop together, and also linked stronger India–China cooperation with the wider BRICS framework.
  • Modi, meanwhile, thanked Xi for China's support and cooperation during India's BRICS chairmanship.
  • The messages are therefore revealing. Neither side is pretending that the trust deficit has disappeared, nor are both attempting to prevent differences from overwhelming the larger relationship.
  • Four major takeaways emerge from the meeting.

1. Differences Must Not Become Disputes

  • The first principle is that disagreements should not be allowed to become confrontation.
  • India reiterated its familiar emphasis on mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest. These principles have particular importance after Galwan because they establish the political conditions under which stabilisation can continue.
  • For India, managing differences does not mean ignoring them. It means creating mechanisms through which disagreements can be addressed without destabilising the entire relationship.
  • This is also where BRICS matters. A "functioning multilateral platform" gives India and China an additional channel through which they can maintain communication even when bilateral tensions persist.

2. Border Peace Remains the Foundation

  • The second and most important takeaway is the border.
  • Prime Minister Modi made clear that peace and tranquillity along the border are essential for the development of the wider relationship. This is perhaps the clearest indication that India is not prepared to separate economic engagement from strategic security.
  • The disputed Line of Actual Control remains largely undemarcated. India continues to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable boundary resolution, while the existing agreements and mechanisms for maintaining peace along the frontier remain important.
  • The message is straightforward: economic cooperation can expand only if border tensions remain "under control"; important here to note that the term "control" has been used, not "settled". This is a decisive shift in the present "GeoPoliNomic arena", a new development, where a short-term compromising stand has been taken just to ensure a long-term goal of a long path to resolve the issue and a new geopolitical equation through Asia,  because if this happens, the largest beneficiaries shall be China & India.    
  • This is why the Modi–Xi meeting should not be described as a "post-Galwan reconciliation." It is better described as a cautious effort to establish strategic stability.

3. Trade, Supply Chains and Connectivity Must Expand—With Safeguards

  • The third takeaway concerns the economic relationship.
  • India and China have enormous economic potential for cooperation, but their trade relationship remains heavily imbalanced. Bilateral trade reached a record $155.6 billion in 2025, while India's imports from China were around $132 billion, producing a trade deficit exceeding $100 billion.
  • India therefore raised the following issues of.
  1. Structural trade imbalances.
  2. Supply-chain difficulties.
  3. Market-access concerns. 
  4. At the same time, both sides recognised the potential for stronger business relations, cultural exchanges and easier movement of people.
  • This represents an important post-Galwan evolution, where India is not arguing for complete economic separation from China; instead, it is seeking "economic engagement" with strategic safeguards.
  • That distinction will become increasingly important as global supply chains are reorganised and countries seek to reduce excessive dependence on any single source.

4. India and China Need Common Ground on Global Issues

  • The fourth takeaway is the most directly connected to BRICS.
  • India and China have substantial disagreements, but they also share an interest in a more representative international system and greater voice for developing countries. Xi explicitly linked stronger China–India relations with greater BRICS cooperation and emphasised the responsibilities of the two countries as major Global South powers.
  • China will assume the BRICS chairmanship in 2027 and host the next summit. Xi has sought India's support for this transition. This creates an important continuity between the Indian and Chinese presidencies.
  • India's 2026 chairmanship has focused on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, while China's forthcoming chairmanship will provide Beijing an opportunity to shape the next stage of the grouping.
  • For India, the challenge will be to cooperate with China inside BRICS without allowing BRICS itself to become dominated by any single member.
  • For China, India's participation is essential if BRICS is to retain broad Global South legitimacy rather than being perceived primarily as an instrument of Chinese geopolitical influence.

What the Modi–Xi Meeting Means for the Changing World Order

  • The "larger significance" of the meeting lies beyond the India–China relationship.
  • The international system is becoming more fragmented and more competitive. The old assumption that economic interdependence would automatically produce political convergence has been weakened by-
  1. geopolitical rivalry, 
  2. sanctions, 
  3. supply-chain disruptions, 
  4. strategic competition, and 
  5. conflicts across different regions. The classic and most appropriate example is "the Middle East" today.
  • In this environment, countries such as India and China are simultaneously competitors and stakeholders in the emerging international order.
  • India seeks "strategic autonomy" rather than permanent alignment with any single power bloc. China seeks a greater role for developing countries in global governance. Other BRICS members have their own priorities. The grouping therefore contains both enormous potential and significant internal contradictions.
  • That is precisely why India–China relations matter so much to BRICS.
  • If the two largest Asian powers allow their bilateral rivalry to paralyse the organisation, BRICS will struggle to become an effective platform for global reform. But if they can maintain strategic restraint and cooperate selectively, BRICS could become an important mechanism for representing the interests of a much larger part of the developing world.
     "The future of BRICS may therefore depend partly on India's ability to work with China without becoming subordinate to China—and China's ability to work with India without demanding strategic alignment."



Conclusion: A BRICS Pathway for India–China Strategic Convergence

  • The emerging India–China equation may ultimately be less about resolving their differences than about creating sufficient strategic space to cooperate where their interests increasingly converge. "The New Delhi Declaration- 2026" provides such a framework: sovereign equality, consensus, stronger Global South cooperation, economic resilience and a more representative multilateral order.
  • For India and China, this creates a "pragmatic opportunity."  Through which India can engage China without compromising strategic autonomy, while China can deepen its Global South outreach through a relationship with India that is more stable and predictable. Their mutual support for each other's BRICS presidencies suggests that both sides recognise the value of this wider institutional space.
  • The way forward, therefore, may be a "calibrated form of strategic convergence without strategic alignment": 
  1. keeping the border question insulated from areas where cooperation is possible. 
  2. Expanding economic and people-to-people engagement.
  3. Coordinating selectively on global governance, development and multilateral reform.
        "Both need to sustain this cautious convergence; only then could India–China cooperation become one of the most consequential internal dynamics shaping the next phase of BRICS—and, ultimately, the evolution of a more multipolar international order."

Thanks. 
Critical Comments are welcome.








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